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Abstract 
No country has been able to sustain a rapid transition out of poverty without raising 
productivity in its agricultural sector.  Despite this historical role of agriculture in 
economic development, both the academic and donor communities lost interest in the 
sector, starting in the mid-1980s.  This was mostly because of low prices in world 
markets for basic agricultural commodities, caused largely by the success of the Green 
Revolution in Asia.  After two decades of neglect, interest in agriculture is returning.  
This paper explores the reasons why agriculture is back on the policy agenda for donors 
and poor countries alike.  The most important reason is new understanding that economic 
growth is the main vehicle for reducing poverty and that growth in the agricultural sector 
plays a major role in that overall growth as well as in connecting the poor to growth. 
There is a sharp debate, however, between “optimists” and “pessimists” over the potential 
for small-scale agriculture to continue to play these historic roles.  In a world of open 
trade, ready availability of cheap food in world markets, continued agricultural protection 
in rich countries, and economies of scale in access to food supply chains that are 
increasingly dominated by supermarkets and export buyers, large-scale farms with state-
of-the-art technology and access to efficient infrastructure can push smallholders out of 
commercial markets.  Consequently, the paper concludes, geographic coverage and 
operational efficiency of rural infrastructure, coupled to effective investment in modern 
agricultural research and extension, will determine the future role for agriculture in 
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Imagine a region of the world where all food and agricultural products were sourced from 
international markets, and domestic agricultural sectors disappeared.  This “world 
without agriculture” is not imaginary.  For many of the world’s poorest countries, 
especially in Africa, a future without agriculture is increasingly being urged as the 
efficient path to development.  Mark Rosenzweig, the new Director of Harvard’s Center 
for International Development, asks at the broadest level “Should Africa do any 
agriculture at all?” (Harvard Magazine, 2004, p. 57).  Adrian Wood, Chief Economist for 
DfID, envisions a “hollowed out” Africa, with most of the population on the coasts where 
they could more effectively produce manufactured exports (Wood, 2002).  Many macro 
economists, convinced of the power of rapid economic growth to lift populations out of 
poverty, see resources devoted to slow-growing agriculture as wasted.  In a world of 
ample food supplies in world markets (some of it free as food aid) and increasingly open 
borders for trade, what is the role of agriculture in pro-poor growth? 
 
Historically, the answer is clear.  No country has been able to sustain a rapid transition 
out of poverty without raising productivity in its agricultural sector (if it had one to 
start—Singapore and Hong Kong are exceptions).  The process involves a successful 
structural transformation where agriculture, through higher productivity, provides food, 
labor, and even savings to the process of urbanization and industrialization.  A dynamic 
agriculture raises labor productivity in the rural economy, pulls up wages, and gradually 
eliminates the worst dimensions of absolute poverty. Somewhat paradoxically, the 
process also leads to a decline in the relative importance of agriculture to the overall 
economy, as the industrial and service sectors grow even more rapidly, partly through 
stimulus from a modernizing agriculture and migration of rural workers to urban jobs. 
 
Despite this historical role of agriculture in economic development, both the academic 
and donor communities lost interest in the sector, starting in the mid-1980s, mostly 
because of low prices in world markets for basic agricultural commodities.  Low prices, 
while a boon to poor consumers and a major reason why agricultural growth specifically, 
and economic growth more generally, was so poor for the general population, made it 
hard to justify policy support for the agricultural sector or new funding for agricultural 
projects (World Bank, 2004d).  Historical lessons are a frail reed in the face of market 
realities and general equilibrium models that show a sharply declining role for agriculture 
in economic growth. 
 
                                                           
1 The author is Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Development, Washington, DC.  This review essay 
relies heavily on my own experience over the past several decades, and is a personal interpretation of Asian 
lessons in relation to the general literature.  For alternative treatments of these issues, with a number of 
similar conclusions, see Dorward, et al. (2004), and DfID (2004).   The DfID review in particular, done in 
collaboration with Anne Thomson of Oxford Policy Management, has a very similar structure and set of 
arguments as this paper (although the first drafts of the two papers seem to have been done in parallel). 
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Three factors are renewing interest in agriculture.  The first new factor is a revolution in 
knowledge of basic genetic structures and mechanisms.  One result of this knowledge is 
the development of agricultural biotechnology, but even without genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs), the genetic revolution will push out the frontier of agricultural 
productivity dramatically (Naylor and Manning, 2005; FAO, 2004; Timmer, 2003; Mew 
et al., 2003).  Many of these productivity gains can be in developing countries, where 
they are needed most.  In particular, there is a real opportunity to increase productivity of 
many neglected and secondary crops that have been by-passed by mainstream 
agricultural research, concerned as it is with improving productivity in the main food 
staples, rice, wheat and corn.  These “orphan” crops, such as millets, sorghums, cassava 
and other root crops, provide the main sustenance for millions of poor households, 
especially in Africa (Naylor, Falcon, et.al., 2004) 
 
Second, even in poorer developing countries a supermarket revolution is transforming 
food retail markets, and the supply chains that provision them, at a faster pace than 
anyone imagined at the turn of the millennium (Reardon et al., 2003; Hu et al., 2004; 
Reardon and Timmer, forthcoming).  There are important new opportunities for farmers 
in these countries to diversify out of low-value crops into new commodities with greater 
demand potential, and thus to capture some of the value added being generated by 
supermarkets.  The strict quality, safety, hygiene, and labor standards demanded by 
supermarkets are a severe challenge to participation by small farmers and there is concern 
that rural poverty might worsen as supermarkets expand, but connecting farmers more 
directly to changing consumer demand offers real hope as well. 
 
Finally, understanding of the determinants of poverty and the mechanisms for reducing it 
in a sustainable fashion have also undergone a quiet revolution in the past decade.  Part of 
this understanding is recognition that economic growth is the main vehicle for reducing 
poverty, but for this to work the distribution of income must not deteriorate too sharply.  
In many circumstances, growth in the agricultural sector has been an important ingredient 
in the formula that connects economic growth to the poor (Ravallion and Huppi, 1991; 
Ravallion and Datt, 1996; Ravallion and Chen, 2004; Sumarto and Suryahadi, 2003; Fan, 
Zhang and Zhang, 2004; Fan, Thorat and Rao, 2004; Timmer, 1997, 2004a, 2005a).   
 
Agriculture and poverty reduction 
 
Earlier literature stressed the direct impact on poverty reduction that comes from rising 
rural wages and incomes.  Most of the world’s poor live in rural areas, or migrated from 
them in search of better opportunities.  It seems almost obvious that growth in 
agricultural productivity is the surest way to end poverty.  The historical evidence 
confirms this logic.  Growth in agricultural productivity not only can increase farm 
incomes, it also stimulates linkages to the non-farm rural economy, causing economic 
growth and rapid poverty reduction, with overall growth multipliers almost always 
significantly greater than one (Hazell and Haggblade, 1993).  
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growth and its poverty-reducing effect.  A growing agricultural sector demands 
nonfarm production inputs, and supplies raw materials to transport, processing, 
and marketing firms.  Likewise, increases in farm incomes lead to greater demand 
for consumer goods and services.  Besides stimulating national economic growth, 
these production and consumption linkages affect poverty and spatial growth 
patterns, particularly when agricultural growth is concentrated on small and 
medium-size farms (Johnston and Kilby, 1975; Mellor, 1976; and Mellor and 
Johnston, 1984).  [Hazell and Haggblade, 1993, p. 190] 
 
But with more open trade possibilities, low prices for staple cereals in world markets, and 
population growth slowing, the size and relevance of these linkages are no longer so 
clear.  Agriculture must be dynamic and profitable if it is to help reduce rural poverty, 
and growing staple cereals has not been a source of dynamism in rural economies for two 
decades.  A profitable agriculture with rising productivity will now depend on 
diversification into crops and livestock with better demand prospects than for cereals, and 
into production for the agri-business sector, which can add value through processing and 
enhanced consumer appeal. 
   
Rural diversification as the conceptual framework 
 
A sequence of progressively broader diversification steps defines a successful agricultural 
transformation (Timmer, 1988).  In countries where farm sizes are small and likely to 
remain that way for decades because of population pressures and insecure property rights, 
diversification from production of staple grains to higher-valued commodities will be the 
first step in this process.  The next step will be to move beyond basic commodity 
production in order to access value-added supply chains for the modern retail sector, 
especially supermarkets, where the value-added comes in the form of quality, timeliness, 
food safety, and labor standards in production.  These are highly management-intensive 
factors and may well contribute to economies of scale in production that are not seen in 
commodity production alone (Timmer, 2004b; Reardon and Timmer, forthcoming). 
 
The next step is the diversification of the rural economy itself, from being primarily 
driven by its agricultural base to depending more on industrial and service sectors as the 
base for rural economic growth.  This step seem feasible only when population densities 
permit substantial clusters of activities that feed on themselves for inputs and demand for 
output (Hayami and Kawagoe, 1993; Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2001).  Thus the 
effectiveness of the model proposed by Mellor (1976, 2000) of demand for labor-
intensive, rural non-tradables as the vehicle for pro-poor growth, driven by agricultural 
profitability and wages from labor-intensive exports, would seem to be conditional on 
good rural infrastructure and human capital, and hence seems to be limited to Asia, parts 
of coastal and highland Africa, and several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.  
At the same time, good rural infrastructure reduces the relative importance of non-
tradables in local economies and increases competitive pressures from world markets.  It 
is precisely this tension that raises doubts about the future potential for agriculture to be 
an important driver in poverty reduction, even in rural areas (DfID, 2004). 
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Where rural diversification is not economically feasible, the alternative to diversification 
out of agricultural commodity production will be the transition of economic activity from 
rural to urban areas.  In this transition, the importance of migration (and remittances) will 
be critical.  It is really quite astonishing how little attention is paid to facilitating the 
migration of rural workers to urban jobs when investments in the rural economy have low 
payoffs.
2  One of the main justifications for investing in rural schools and public health 
facilities is to improve the competitiveness of rural migrants to urban areas. 
 
Whatever the stage or dimension of rural diversification, it must be driven by market 
demand.  Since the 1970s, the development profession has identified “market demand” 
with border prices and international trade, on the assumption that domestic markets are 
saturated, politically manipulated, or not remunerative for producers of higher quality 
products.  This focus on international trade has allowed a revolution in food marketing in 
developing countries to go virtually unnoticed until several years ago, the extensive 
consolidation of the food retail sector and the rapid rise of supermarkets. The revolution 
has already created a challenge to higher rural incomes because the process has a 
tendency to have such high standards for quality, safety, hygiene and farm labor practices 
that many of a country’s own farmers are excluded from the supply chains that provision 
their consumers, even poor consumers (Reardon et al., 2003; Timmer, 2004b). 
 
In the ultimate stage of rural diversification, globalization permits procurement officers to 
source food supplies from anywhere in the world, so local farmers compete not just 
against each other for local consumers, they compete against the global market.  But 
farmers increasingly also have access to the global market if they are the low-cost 
producer meeting global standards.  The future of agricultural development will depend 
on putting productive new technologies in the hands of farmers and creating an open 
market environment to make the resulting production as profitable to farmers as 
employment opportunities in other sectors.  Where that development is not possible, and 
there will be many environments where it is not, rural poverty will only be solved by 
migration to alternative opportunities, usually in urban areas. 
   
Where the strategy does work, diversifying the rural economy will be the key to 
increasing income opportunities.  Placing rural diversification at the center of agricultural 
and rural development means there are two quite different tasks that need to be managed 
simultaneously:  (a) raising the productivity of staple food crops for those farmers who 
continue to grow them; and (b) using the low costs of these staple foods as “fuel” for the 
agricultural diversification effort, including as the wage good for workers and as feed for 
livestock.  In low-income Asia, diversification will depend on continued availability of 
low-cost rice, especially in rural markets.  In Africa and Latin America, having cheap 
corn, wheat and rice available in rural markets will be important if diversification is to be 
successful.  Low-cost staple foods are also important to the poor directly, because they 
devote such a large share of their budget to them, and indirectly, because low real wages, 
made possible by cheap food staples, make labor-intensive activities more profitable.  
                                                           
2  The penultimate draft of the World Bank’s Directions in Development:  Agriculture and Poverty 
Reduction, barely mentions the topic (World Bank, 2004d) 
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poor” things the development community can hope to accomplish between now and the 
target date for the Millennium Development Goals in 2015. 
 
 
The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development 
 
  
The role of agriculture in economic development is complicated and controversial, 
despite a long historical literature examining the topic (Johnston and Mellor, 1961; 
Hayami and Ruttan, 1985; Timmer, 2002).  Part of the controversy stems from the 
structural transformation itself, which is a general equilibrium process not easily 
understood from within the agricultural sector (Timmer, 1988).  Over long historical 
periods, agriculture’s role seems to evolve through four basic stages:  the early “Mosher” 
stage when “getting agriculture moving” is the main policy objective (Mosher, 1966); the 
“Johnston-Mellor” stage when agriculture contributes to economic growth through a 
variety of linkages (Johnston and Mellor, 1961); the “T.W. Schultz” stage when rising 
agricultural incomes still fall behind those in a rapidly growing non-agricultural 
economy, inducing serious political tensions (Schultz, 1978); and the “D. Gale Johnson” 
stage where labor and financial markets fully integrate the agricultural economy into the 
rest of the economy (Johnson, 1997; Gardner, 2002).  These stages were first proposed in 
Timmer (1988) and are developed in the context of more recent experience in the World 
Bank’s latest treatment of the role of agriculture in poverty reduction (World Bank, 
2004d).  Efforts to “skip” the early stages and jump directly to a modern industrial 
economy have generally been a disaster.   
 
Another reason for controversy over the role of agriculture stems from the heterogeneity 
of agricultural endowments and the vastly different cropping systems seen in Latin 
America, Africa and Asia (not to mention the diversity within these regions).  It is 
unrealistic to expect much of a common role in such diverse settings.  When coupled with 
the enormous differences in stage of development around the world, and hence the vastly 
different roles that agriculture plays in economies at different levels of economic 
maturity, it is easy to understand why there is so little common ground in academia or the 
donor community on the role of agriculture in economic development.  Bravo-Ortega and 
Lederman (2004) document clearly the different contributions of agriculture to national 
welfare across these various categories. 
 
There does seem to be widespread agreement in the literature on the basic linkages 
connecting agriculture and overall economic growth that were first articulated to a 
general economics audience by Lewis (1954) and Johnston-Mellor (1961).  At a 
conceptual level, these linkages have long been part of the core of modern development 
theory and practice (Timmer, 1988; 2002).  Establishing the empirical value of these 
linkages in different settings has been a cottage industry since the early 1970s (Byerlee, 
1973; Mellor and Lele, 1973; King and Byerlee, 1978; Hazell and Roell, 1983; 
Haggblade, Hammer and Hazell; 1991; Hazell and Haggblade; 1993; Timmer, 1997; 
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Zhang, 2002; Fan, Thorat and Rao, 2004).   
 
Virtually all of these studies conclude that the “agriculture multiplier” is significantly 
greater than one, especially in relatively closed, “non-tradable” economies of the sort 
found in rural Africa, where the multiplier is often between 2 and 3.  But even in the 
more open economies of Asia, where rice was more tradable than most African staple 
foods and local prices more easily reflected border prices, the agriculture multiplier is 
close to 2 in the early stages of agricultural modernization when productivity gains are 
the fastest. Because economic growth usually has a direct impact on poverty, any 
contribution agriculture makes to speeding overall economic growth through these large 
multipliers will, in most circumstances, also directly contribute to reducing poverty 
(Dollar and Kraay, 2002; World Bank, 2004a). 
 
Despite the potential impact of these large multipliers, a combination of market failures 
and political biases led to a systematic undervaluation of output from rural economies.  
Correcting these biases can have economy-wide benefits.  The historic bias against the 
rural sector in developing countries left them starved for resources and discriminated 
against by macro economic and trade policies (Lipton, 1977; Timmer, 1993).  Failures in 
rural credit and labor markets – some of which can cause “poverty traps” – have provided 
the analytical context for much of modern neoclassical development economics 
(Dasgupta, 1993).  But even global commodity markets for many products from 
developing countries “fail” in the sense that agricultural surpluses from rich countries are 
dumped there, depressing world market prices below long-run costs of production. 
 
A final set of linkages makes growth originating in the agricultural sector tend to be more 
“pro-poor” than it would be if the source of growth came from the industrial or service 
sectors (Mellor, 1976; Ravallion and Datt, 1996; Ravallion and Chen, 2004; Timmer, 
1997, 2002).  New agricultural technologies that improve farm productivity strengthen 
this connection.  Separate reviews by Thirtle, et al. (2004) and by Majid (2004) confirm 
the strong empirical link between higher agricultural productivity and poverty reduction. 
   
 
Direct contribution to economic growth via Lewis linkages 
 
 
The “Lewis Linkages” between agriculture and economic growth provide the non-
agricultural sector with labor and capital freed up by higher productivity in the 
agricultural sector.  These linkages work primarily through factor markets, but there is no 
suggestion that these markets work perfectly in the dualistic setting analyzed by Lewis 
(1954).  Chenery and Syrquin (1975) argue that a major source of economic growth is the 
transfer of low-productivity labor from the rural to the urban sector.  If labor markets 
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The “Johnston-Mellor Linkages” allow market-mediated, input-output interactions 
between the two sectors so that agriculture can contribute to economic development.  
These linkages are based on the agricultural sector supplying raw materials to industry, 
food for industrial workers, markets for industrial output, and the exports to earn foreign 
exchange needed to import capital goods (Johnston and Mellor, 1961).  Again, for the 
Johnston-Mellor linkages as with the Lewis linkages, it is difficult to see any significance 
for policy or economic growth unless some of the markets that serve these linkages are 
operating imperfectly (or, as with many risk markets, are missing altogether).  That is, 
resource allocations must be out of equilibrium and face constraints and bottlenecks not 
immediately reflected in market prices if increases in agricultural output are to stimulate 
the rest of the economy at a rate that causes the “contribution” from agriculture to be 
greater than the market value of the output, i.e. the agricultural income multiplier is 
greater than one (Timmer, 1995). 
 
Roundabout contributions from agriculture to economic growth 
 
Writing in the mid-1960s, Mosher was able to assume that “getting agriculture moving” 
would have a high priority in national plans because of its “obvious” importance in 
feeding people and providing a spur to industrialization (Mosher, 1966).  That 
assumption has held only in parts of East and Southeast Asia, and has been badly off the 
mark in much of Africa and Latin America.  In the latter regions, a historically prolonged 
and deep urban bias led to a distorted pattern of investment.  Too much public and private 
capital was invested in urban areas and too little in rural areas.  Too much capital was 
held as liquid and non-productive investments that rural households use to manage risk.  
Too little capital was invested in raising rural productivity. 
 
Such distortions have resulted in strikingly different marginal productivities of capital in 
urban and rural areas.  New growth strategies--such as those pursued in Indonesia after 
1966, China after 1978, and Vietnam after 1989--altered investment priorities in favor of 
rural growth and benefited from this disequilibrium in rates of return, at least initially.  
For example, in Indonesia from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, farm GDP per capita 
increased by nearly half, whereas it had declined from 1900 to the mid-1960s.  In China, 
the increase from 1978 to 1994 was nearly 70 percent, whereas this measure had dropped 
by 20 percent between 1935 and 1978 (Prasada Rao, Maddison and Lee, 2002).  A switch 
in investment strategy and improved rates of return on capital increase factor productivity 
(and farm income) because efficiency in resource allocation is improved. 
   
One explanation for more rapid and pro-poor economic growth as urban bias is reduced is 
provided by Mellor’s model of agricultural growth, rural employment and poverty 
reduction that emphasizes the role of the rural non-tradables sector in pulling 
underemployed workers out of agriculture and into the non-agricultural rural economy.  
The Mellor model explicitly integrates manufactured export performance (the source of 
much dynamism in East Asia’s economies since the 1960s) and the non-tradables sector 
in the rural economy (which includes a wide array of local agro-processing) to explain 
  9subsequent reductions in poverty.  This model, drawing on Mellor’s earlier work in India 
(Mellor, 1976) and more recently in Egypt (Mellor, 2000), explains why countries with 
substantial agricultural sectors that experienced rapid growth from labor-intensive 
manufactured exports had such good records of overall economic growth and poverty 
reduction. 
   
An additional set of linkages focuses on more nebulous and hard-to-measure connections 
between growth in agricultural productivity and growth in the rest of the economy.  
These linkages grow explicitly out of market failures, and, if they are quantitatively 
important, government interventions are required for the growth process to proceed as 
rapidly as possible.  The contribution of agricultural growth to productivity growth in the 
non-agricultural economy stems from several sources:  greater efficiency in decision 
making as rural enterprises claim a larger share of output and higher productivity of 
industrial capital as urban bias is reduced; higher productivity of labor as nutritional 
standards are improved; and a link between agricultural profitability (as distinct from 
agricultural productivity) and household investments in rural human capital, which raises 
labor productivity as well as facilitates rural-urban migration. 
 
Several of these mechanisms stand out as likely to be important (and potentially 
measurable) because they draw on the efficiency of decision making in rural households, 
the low opportunity cost of their labor resources, the opportunity for farm investment 
without financial intermediaries, and the potential to earn high rates of return on public 
investments that correct for urban bias.  Each of these factors alone, as public investments 
and favorable policy stimulate growth in the agricultural sector, should cause an increase 
in the efficiency of resource allocation.  In combination, these mechanisms should 
translate faster agricultural growth into measurably faster economic growth in aggregate, 
after controlling for the direct contribution of the agricultural sector to growth in GDP 
itself. 
   
One of the most visible determinants of poverty is hunger and malnutrition.  The 
development profession continues to argue over the causation—whether hunger causes 
poverty or vice versa--but hunger as a measure of poverty is widely established.  Most 
poverty lines have an explicit or implicit food component.  The evidence for nutritional 
poverty traps, where workers are too malnourished to work hard enough to feed 
themselves and their families, has strong historical roots (Fogel, 1991, 1994; Bliss and 
Stern, 1978; Strauss, 1986; Strauss and Thomas, 1998).  But simple energy shortages 
cannot account for very much of the chronic poverty observed over the past several 
decades because the cost of raw calories, in the form of staple foods, has fallen too 
sharply relative to wages for unskilled labor (Johnson, 1997; Fox, 2002).  If inadequate 
food intake is the primary cause of poverty, the solution would be in sight (and food aid 
could be an important part of the answer).  If, however, poverty is the main cause of 
inadequate food intake, hunger will be much harder to end.  In most countries, the 
domestic agricultural sector is likely to play a key role in ending hunger (and ready 
availability of food aid may well be part of the problem). 
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“Unity in Diversity,” the national motto of Indonesia, aptly describes the Asian 
experience with agriculture and pro-poor growth.  Despite enormous diversity in 
ecological settings, political histories, and economic policies, several common lessons 
emerge from a long-run review of Asian experience. 
 
Four country studies, plus other Asian experience 
 
A close reading of the four Asian country studies for the pro-poor growth project of the 
World Bank (World Bank, 2004a) suggests three fundamentally different, and mostly 
inconsistent, stories about the role of agriculture in pro-poor growth.  First, the Indian 
case study by Besley, Burgess and Esteve-Volart (BBEV, 2004) argues on the basis of an 
enormously rich data set and very sophisticated econometrics that agriculture has played 
a minimal role at best in India’s reduction of poverty.  BBEV find that both the secondary 
and tertiary sectors have contributed more to poverty reduction in the main Indian states 
than has the primary sector, a result that directly contradicts earlier, and seminal, findings 
by Ravallion and Datt (1996). 
 
Second, the Bangladesh case study (B. Sen, Mujeri and Shahabuddin, 2004) and Vietnam 
case study (Bonschab and Klump, 2004) each argue that agriculture played a large and 
crucial role in poverty reduction, but for highly idiosyncratic reasons based on unique 
initial conditions and domestic institutions.  Agriculture was important to pro-poor 
growth in both countries, but that role cannot be generalized to other countries.  Sen does 
argue that the general Bangladesh experience with economic growth and poverty 
reduction is relevant to other countries, including those in Africa, that are starting from 
extreme poverty and with few institutional resources, but Bangladesh’s agricultural 
experience is unique to the ecological setting of the country. 
 
Finally, the Indonesian case study (Timmer, 2005b) argues that conscious policy stimulus 
to agriculture was the key to the country’s 30-year record of rapid, pro-poor growth (from 
1967 to 1997), and that the model of smallholder agricultural development used by 
Indonesia is quite general.  The Indonesian model is explicitly set in the broader 
historical literature on the role of agriculture and economic development that has been 
generated by successful countries not burdened with highly skewed land distributions as a 
starting point for their development (Johnston and Mellor, 1961; Johnston and Kilby, 
1975; Hayami and Ruttan, 1985, Timmer, 1988, 2002). 
 
Unfortunately, broadening the perspective to the rest of Asia from just these four country 
studies, and to the longer historical record, does nothing to reconcile these three disparate 
interpretations of the role of agriculture in pro-poor growth.  The Japanese example, long 
thought to be the early model of agriculture-led growth in Asia (Ohkawa, 1965, Ohkawa, 
Johnston and Kaneda, 1969; Ohkawa and Rosovsky, 1976) has been challenged by 
modern historians using general equilibrium models to analyze sectoral relationships 
(Brandt, 1993; van der Eng, 1993).  The result is that agriculture in post-Meiji Japan 
  11seems to have been more of a “hand-maiden” than the “engine” of economic growth, to 
borrow Irving Kravis’s (1970) phrase. 
 
Similarly, no clarification comes from the Korean or Taiwanese examples.  Korea has 
long been held out as the counterexample to an important role for agriculture in economic 
development (Moon, 1975; Ban, Moon and Perkins, 1980), with state-directed, export-led 
industrialization as the engine of growth and poverty reduction.  Even the Taiwanese 
example, long cherished by agricultural development specialists as a model for rural-
based poverty reduction (Oshima, 1987; Lee, 1971; Mellor, 1976; Johnston and Kilby, 
1975; Ranis and Stewart, 1987), has recently seen a surprising empirical rejection of that 
role.  Warr (2003) can find no significant impact from agricultural growth on poverty 
reduction in Taiwan between the 1960s and the 1990s, whereas industrial growth was a 
statistically significant and powerful driver of poverty reduction.  This result is 
surprisingly similar to what BBEV (2004) report for India. 
 
Finally, to add to the confusion, Ravallion and Chen (2004) report that nearly all of the 
remarkable reduction in poverty in China between 1980 and 2001 was the result of 
agricultural growth specifically and diversified rural economic growth more broadly.  
They can find very little impact from growth in urban industrial and service sectors on 
reductions in the headcount poverty index (or the poverty gap or squared poverty gap). 
 
What are we to make of all this confusion?  First, enforcing common data, definitions, 
and methodologies would help clarify the different cases considerably.  For example, the 
panel data used by BBEV permit them to estimate a fixed-effects model that controls for 
state and year effects, a procedure not attempted in the other country studies.  But much 
of the impact of agriculture on poverty is likely to be specific to states and years because 
of ecological endowments and annual variations in the monsoon.  Removing these from 
the statistical discussion may be a “baby with the bathwater” phenomenon.  Despite 
efforts to impose a common methodology on the country studies, it is difficult to compare 
them with respect to the impact of agriculture on pro-poor growth.  
 
Second, looking beyond “first-round” effects of agricultural growth directly on poverty 
reduction is crucial, because linkages and multipliers are both conceptually and 
empirically important in the imperfect market economies under investigation.  Again, a 
common methodology and data structure would help enormously, especially if the careful 
study carried out by Fan, Thorat and Rao (2004) for India could be replicated for other 
Asian countries. Their dissection of the poverty impact of various agricultural 
investments and subsidies, disaggregated by decade from 1950 to 2000, shows clearly the 
mechanisms by which the multipliers work and, importantly, how their quantitative 
impact changes over time as the structure of the economy evolves.  There is obviously no 
single answer to the question, “what is the size of the agricultural multiplier?” 
 
Third, the key question is, “what would the Asian poverty record look like if these 
countries had ignored their agricultural sectors?”  An alternative way to ask the question 
is “what would Asia look like now if it had followed African development strategies for 
the past three decades?”  Posing the counterfactual in this fashion is rather sobering, for it 
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historical story.  Purging endogeneity from our econometric models and results, and 
concentrating analysis on only what we can measure with great precision, may also be 
throwing out much of what is important to the policy choices actually made by 
governments.  The very ambitious analysis by Smith and Urey (2002) of the relationship 
between agricultural growth and poverty reduction in India since 1950 shows very clearly 
the important investments and policy attention to reaching India’s rural poor through 
institutional and technical change in agriculture.  This attention before the Green 
Revolution established an environment in which the new technologies could have 
widespread impact on both the rural and urban poor. 
 
Finally, asking about the role of agriculture in pro-poor growth seems to be asking the 
question in too narrow a fashion.  All four of the country studies, and the Ravallion-Chen 
study of China, note (sometimes just in passing) that the rural non-farm economy has 
been (or in the case of Vietnam, could be) an important mechanism for connecting the 
poor to economic growth.  It is here that the linkages among agricultural growth per se, 
overall economic growth, and the connection of the poor to that growth, become crucial, 
for most of these linkages are likely to be transmitted via the rural non-farm economy 
(and via changes in food prices for economies that are not totally open to world markets 
or which might be “large” actors in those markets, such as the countries in Asia discussed 
here).  The World Bank review of the Bangladesh rural non-farm sector (World Bank, 
2004c) has an especially clear framework for understanding these linkages, and 
measuring their empirical relevance in Bangladesh.  A similar review is just starting in 
Indonesia. 
 
Still, the question for this paper is the role of agriculture in pro-poor growth, and it 
remains important to understand the answer because most government agencies, 
programs, statistical accounts, and donor assistance are organized by sector.  Scientific 
research and technical change tends to be crop and animal specific, as the difficulty in 
improving complex cropping systems demonstrates.  And, as will be argued below, it 
remains likely that the household incomes from a profitable agriculture, plus the market 
demands for inputs and output marketing and processing generated by these household 
enterprises, remain the “prime mover” of the overall rural economy until very late in the 
development process.  At this point tourism, industry and high-value services relying on 
modern communications technology can be located anywhere. 
 
The Role of the Structural Transformation 
 
Standing back from the wealth of detail available in the country studies and supporting 
documents listed in the bibliography, an “Asian” pattern of rural development and 
poverty reduction emerges.  The common structure involves the evolution of the 
agricultural sector from a starting point of household subsistence production, through the 
adoption of new technologies that provide surpluses and rural food security, to more 
diversified farm activities driven by commercial forces, and finally to the full integration 
of the agricultural economy into the overall economy.   
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of the main policy concerns shown by Asian countries at each stage, and the links 
between these policy concerns and the key economic drivers and mechanisms for change.  
Asia may have been unique in its early concern for food security, including for rural 
households, as the main policy focus that mobilized substantial resources on behalf of 
agriculture (Timmer, 2005a).  The importance of rice in Asian food security, and the 
tenuous (and tense) relationship between domestic rice economies and the world market 
for rice, focused political and economic attention on agricultural productivity in ways not 
seen in other parts of the world. 
 
For Asia, the Green Revolution technologies for wheat and rice transformed their 
potential for a domestic approach to food security.  When this potential was fully 
realized, in Indonesia in the early 1980s, in India in the late 1980s, in Bangladesh in the 
early 1990s and in Vietnam in the mid-1990s, the policy concern turned to supporting 
farm incomes in the face of declining world prices for cereals.  The “efficient” way to do 
this was through the next structural phase, into diversification and specialization, and 
Bangladesh seems to be moving in this direction.  The more advanced regions in China 
are already well down this road.  The alternative approach, however, is to maintain farm 
incomes by protecting the rice sector, using subsidies to keep inputs cheap, and thus to 
slow the diversification process.  Both India and Indonesia are caught in this expensive 
and distortionary approach.  It is impossible to move on to the stage of rapid productivity 
growth and integration into the overall economy as long as the diversification phase is 
postponed. 
 
The second perspective on these structural changes is from the point of view of relations 
between the farm and rural non-farm sectors.  None of the country papers spend much 
time on the rural non-farm sector, although the Indonesia paper stresses the importance of 
Mellor’s model of non-tradables production, mostly in rural areas, as the key to 
understanding the role of agriculture in pro-poor growth (Timmer, 2005b, pp. 20-22).  
But the broader literature helps understand this role more clearly.  In particular, there 
seems to be a structural transformation of enterprises in the rural non-farm sector that 
parallels that of agricultural enterprises, as they evolve from very small household-based 
enterprises into larger firms with “permanent” structures as the place of business.  These 
permanent, rural non-farm enterprises were the fastest growing part of the Bangladesh 
economy in the 1990s (World Bank, 2004c). 
 
All of the Asian countries are having a very difficult time transitioning from the “food 
security” to the “farm income” and on to the “rural productivity” objective for public 
policy (Timmer, 2005a).  The difficulties are clearest in India and Indonesia, where the 
preferred policy mechanism is price protection and input subsidies, not diversification 
and commercialization.  Similar pressures are evident in Bangladesh, Vietnam and China, 
but budget pressures and more successful diversification by the market have helped keep 
the structural retardation under control. 
 
This retardation is seen most clearly in enterprise productivity in the rural non-farm 
sector.  India and Indonesia are seriously lagging in this regard.  China, because of its 
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seems to be in the vanguard of rural enterprise development.  Bangladesh, because of 
sheer population density and shrinking agricultural land, is developing productive rural 
non-farm enterprises at a surprisingly rapid rate (World Bank, 2004c).  There is little 
information on the topic in the Vietnam paper, but it does suggest that rural non-farm 
enterprises should become the leading source of rural employment growth in that 
country.  The problem until now has been the socialist planning legacy and restricted 
property rights for owners of non-farm rural enterprises.  Accordingly, Vietnam has 
focused more on an urban growth pole model than on diversified rural enterprises.  As a 
consequence, rural to urban migration is a much larger factor in the poverty reduction 
story in Vietnam than it seems to be in the other countries studied. 
 
Much of India’s problem stems from the “structure” of its support to the rural economy, 
i.e. from the relative size of subsidies compared with investments, especially in roads and 
agricultural research (Fan, Thorat and Rao, 2004; World Bank, 2004b).  The political 
economy of agricultural subsidies in a democracy is well understood, but India is the 
poorest country to try them on such an extravagant scale.  The cost is not just to the 
budget, although that is high enough.  The larger costs seem to be to the agricultural 
transformation itself, and hence to the structural transformation, which is the only long-
run hope for India’s poor. 
 
The other “large” common theme across the papers with respect to the role of agriculture 
in pro-poor growth is the impact of food prices on poverty.  In India, Indonesia, and 
Bangladesh, the story is consistent and unambiguous.  Higher productivity in the food 
crop sector, especially in domestic rice production, led to lower relative food prices in 
both rural and urban areas, with very substantial impact on the poor.  The India and 
Bangladesh papers argue that this mechanism may have been the leading contribution of 
agriculture to pro-poor growth. 
 
The impact of rice prices on the poor in Vietnam is more complex.  Much of Vietnam’s 
rapid poverty reduction was driven directly by higher incomes in rice-producing 
households, stimulated to a large extent by the realignment of the exchange rate and 
consequently greater price incentives for production and export.  In some sense, 
Vietnam’s reforms transformed rice from a non-tradable to a tradable commodity, with 
large gains in efficiency and output.  But regions less well situated for rapid expansion of 
rice production, and the poor in urban areas, were probably hurt by this new economic 
environment.  Bonschab and Klump (2004) argue that much of the widening in income 
inequality across regions was because of differential potential for rice exports. 
 
The Chinese story seems to be radically different.  Ravallion and Chen (2004) show that 
poverty rates fall dramatically when rural producer prices are higher, implying that most 
of the rural poor have their net incomes directly and positively affected by food prices.  
Because of the nature of the Chinese food marketing system however, Ravallion and 
Chen argue that improving terms of trade for farmers is equivalent to removing a tax on 
their incomes and does not actually have a direct impact on food prices for consumers.  If 
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where lower food prices directly benefit the poor. 
 
The Importance of the Rural, Non-Farm Economy 
 
Even when comparing five of the largest countries in the world, all of them rice-based 
food economies in Asia (with apologies to the wheat farmers in Bangladesh, China and 
India, and the maize farmers in poorer parts of most of these countries), it is striking how 
diverse they are, both at one time across countries and within a single country across 
time.  This diversity extends to the role of agriculture in pro-poor growth, in three 
important ways. 
 
First, the initial conditions and institutional settings for rapid gains in productivity varied 
enormously in the 1960s, when new rice and wheat technologies became available from 
the International Agricultural Research Centers (or from domestic centers in China).  
India had been investing heavily in irrigation, agricultural universities, land reform, and 
fertilizer production well before the Green Revolution, whereas Indonesia had virtually 
destroyed what little agricultural infrastructure remained when the Dutch were forced out.  
Bangladesh took over a decade to become a functioning country after independence in 
1971.  Vietnam was prone to famines before 1989 and imported rice to feed even its farm 
population.  Opening its economy and stabilizing macro policy led to a surge in 
agriculture, but continued socialist controls on private ownership and market restrictions 
prevented a dynamic rural non-farm sector from emerging.  Migration has become a 
leading source of poverty reduction in Vietnam.  Despite the early success in China with 
TVEs, rural to urban migration has also been essential there to linking the poor to 
economic growth. 
 
Second, despite all the temporal and cross section diversity, a common pattern of 
structural transformation can be seen.  The Asian experience shows clearly that this 
structural transformation is driven by a successful agricultural transformation.  In turn, 
the investments in agriculture needed for this transformation, in both policy and financial 
terms, were driven by a deep political concern for food security (Timmer, 2005a).  The 
very integrity of the state was threatened by hunger and famine, whether in democratic 
India, autocratic Indonesia, or communist Vietnam or China (although the communist 
countries certainly held out longer in the face of hunger and famine than did the more 
open societies).  This concern for food security drove the transition from subsistence 
agricultural to rural food surpluses, thus alleviating rural poverty directly, and overall 
poverty through lower real food prices. 
 
Third, diversity returns again at the next stage.  None of these five countries has yet 
managed a successful transition from rural food security to rural productivity through 
diversification and commercialization.  Some countries are more successful than others, 
as parts of China, Bangladesh, and areas on Java are responding quickly to the economic 
signals pushing in this direction.  But almost uniformly, policymakers are resisting this 
transition, apparently because they fear a loss of food security as measured by the relative 
volume of rice imports. 
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A reader from outside Asia, seeking lessons for Latin America or Africa from these five 
countries, would be excused for being totally confused.  Gains in food crop production, 
stimulated by government investments, subsidies to inputs, and guaranteed output prices, 
were the initial basis for pro-poor growth in all these countries.  But now those same 
policy instruments are counterproductive both for growth and the poor.  Agriculture 
needs to restructure into a diversified and commercialized sector that will have little 
direct impact on the poor, even through food prices.  At this stage, especially in India and 
Indonesia, agriculture’s main impact on poverty is more likely to come through its 
support for a dynamic rural non-farm economy, which will be a bridge for the rural poor 
to cross on their way to jobs in the formal economy. 
 
This role does not show up in the econometric tests of agriculture’s contribution to 
poverty reduction, for two reasons.  First, this “new” agriculture is still largely nascent, 
and hence does not appear in the statistical record very clearly.  Second, the impact will 
be through the linkages and multipliers that have been hard to conceptualize, model and 
estimate, because they depend so crucially on local conditions and institutional context.  
That does not mean that the role of agriculture in pro-poor growth has diminished to the 
point of being irrelevant.  It does mean that agriculture’s role, as always, must be 
understood in the context of multi-sectoral and general equilibrium frameworks, not 
through a sectoral lens alone. 
 
 
Connecting Agriculture to Poverty Reduction:  General Lessons 
 
 
In current strategies used by countries and donor agencies to cope with poverty, the role 
of agriculture has been limited, largely because of failure to recognize the importance of 
direct links between agricultural development, food availability, caloric intake by the 
poor, and reduction in poverty.  Part of the reduction in poverty is definitional because 
the poverty line is often measured in caloric terms.  But raising caloric intake of the poor 
has a positive effect on their well-being, work productivity, and investment in human 
capital.  Empirical evidence provided by Paul Schultz (1993) and Fogel (1991) illustrates 
this importance, but a more general case can also be made. 
 
The case builds on three empirical relationships:  between agricultural growth and 
poverty alleviation; between increases in domestic food production and improvements in 
nutrient intake; and between agricultural productivity and productivity growth in the rest 
of the economy.  It has long been established that, for a given level of income per capita, 
a higher share of GDP originating in agriculture contributes to a more equal distribution 
of income (Kuznets, 1955; Chenery and Syrquin, 1975).  An agriculture-driven growth 
strategy, if it does not sacrifice aggregate growth, directs a greater share of income to the 
poor, i.e. it is more pro-poor.  This is the essential first step in breaking the cycle of 
poverty. 
 
  17Next, increases in domestically produced food supplies contribute directly to increases in 
average caloric intake per capita, after controlling for changes in income per capita, 
income distribution, and food prices (Timmer, 1996). Countries with rapidly increasing 
food production have much better records of poverty alleviation, perhaps because of 
changes in the local economics of access to food, changes that are not captured by 
aggregate statistics on incomes and prices.  The most recent confirmation of this 
relationship is in Majid (2004).  With the $1 per day headcount poverty rate from the ILO 
data set as the dependent variable, both the log of agricultural output per worker and the 
per capita food production index have a large and statistically significant impact on 
reducing poverty (controlling for per capita income and other standard variables). 
 
Whatever the mechanisms, intensive campaigns to raise domestic food production 
through rural investments and rapid technical change, can be expected to have positive 
spillover effects on nutrient intake among the poor. This is the second step in breaking 
the cycle of poverty. 
 
The third step is to ensure that these sectoral gains can be sustained without distorting the 
economy or destroying the environment.  These dual goals can be achieved only if factor 
productivity increases for the entire economy.  Eventually, growth in factor productivity 
must provide a substantial share of total growth in income per capita.  When using its 
resource base efficiently, agriculture has a key role to play at this stage as well (Sarris, 
2001; Timmer, 2005c). 
 
Valuing the poverty-reducing role of agriculture 
 
Agriculture has been seriously undervalued by both the public and private sectors in 
those societies in which poverty has remained untouched or even deepened.  In addition 
to an urban bias in domestic policies, the root cause of this undervaluation is a set of 
market failures.  Commodity prices, by not valuing reduced hunger or progress against 
poverty, often do not send signals with appropriate incentives to decision makers.  These 
inappropriate signals cause several problems, in addition to those noted above. 
 
First, low values for agricultural commodities in the marketplace are reflected in low 
political commitments.  But political commitments to rural growth are needed to generate 
a more balanced political economy, with less urban bias than has been seen in most 
developing countries historically (Lipton, 1977; Timmer, 1993).  The developing world 
has already seen a notable reduction in the macroeconomic biases against agriculture, 
such as overvalued currencies, repression of financial systems, and exploitive terms of 
trade (Westphal and Robinson, 2002).  Further progress might be expected as democracy 
spreads and empowers the rural population in poor countries (although agricultural 
policies in most democracies make economists cringe). 
 
The second problem with low valuation of agricultural commodities is that rural labor is 
also undervalued.   This weakens the link between urban and rural labor markets, which 
is often manifested in the form of seasonal migration and remittances.  There is no hope 
of reducing rural poverty without rising real wages for rural workers.  Rising wages have 
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higher living standards in both parts of the economy.  Migration of workers from rural to 
urban areas raises other issues, of course, but those issues depend fundamentally on 
whether this migration is driven by the push of rural poverty or the pull of urban jobs 
(Larson and Mundlak, 1997). 
   
Either way, the food security dimensions of rural-urban migration are clear.  Urban 
markets become relatively more important in supplying food needs for the population.  
Whether the country’s own rural economy or the world market is the best source of this 
supply will be one of the prime strategic issues facing economic policy makers and 
negotiators for the Doha Round of trade deliberations (Naylor and Falcon, 1995; Tabor, 
2002; Elliott, 2004).  It is no accident that China, through its commitments upon entering 
the WTO, has decided to use world markets to provision a significant share of its basic 
food supply.  The intent is to keep food costs low and stable and thus to provide a 
competitive advantage to its labor-intensive industries and producers of high-value 
agricultural commodities.  China sees few income opportunities for small-scale producers 
of staple grains. 
 
 
Getting Agriculture Moving:  What worked? 
 
 
There is no great secret to agricultural development.  Mosher (1966) and Schultz (1964) 
had identified the key constraints and strategic elements by the mid-1960s.  New 
agricultural technology and incentive prices in local markets combine to generate 
profitable farm investments and income streams that simultaneously increase commodity 
output and lift the rural economy out of poverty (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985).  The process 
can be speeded up by investing in the human capital of rural inhabitants, especially 
through education, and by assistance in the development of new agricultural technology, 
especially where modern science is needed to play a key role in providing the genetic 
foundation for higher yields. 
 
Beyond this level of general understanding, however, the diversity of rural circumstances 
has complicated agricultural development and made it country-specific.  The mechanisms 
for both technology development and provision of rural price incentives are no longer as 
clear as they were in the 1960s (DfID, 2004).  The Consultative Group for International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR), manager of such centers as the International Rice 
Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines, has produced many breakthroughs for the 
world’s staple grains.  But core funding for the system has been falling for nearly two 
decades as the market prices of these crops have dropped to historic lows, under the 
weight of productivity gains in developing countries and government-subsidized crop 





  19The basics of agricultural development 
 
History does provide general insights into the components of an agricultural development 
strategy.  First, obviously, is a supportive macroeconomic policy, one that yields low 
inflation, a reasonably stable exchange rate, positive real interest rates, and perhaps some 
monitoring of disruptive short-run capital flows.  Second, “getting prices right” extends 
good macro policy to the trade arena, where an open economy with low barriers to both 
internal and external trade should generate a level playing field for producers and 
consumers alike.  The need to keep these barriers low is one of the major arguments 
against interventionist price policies for staple foods, even when a case can be made on 
the basis of protecting the poor or stabilizing the economy (Timmer and Dawe, 2005).   
 
Price support and stabilization programs were ubiquitous throughout Asia during the 
drive to adopt “green revolution” technologies (Timmer, 1991, 2005a; Dorward, et al., 
2004).  Their continued role is questionable, however, as world rice markets are now just 
as stable as wheat and maize markets, and the institutional mechanisms used to 
implement these programs, especially parastatals with monopoly control of grain 
markets, have become hopelessly corrupt and ineffective (Cummings and Gulati, 2004).  
Thus the modern judgment is that just two basic components make up the essentials of 
“good economic governance” that underpin modern economic growth—sound macro 
economic policy and an open trade policy.
3  Agricultural development strategies must 
work within this “neutral” policy framework. 
 
What remains after this?  The externalities from rural growth outlined above argue for a 
significant public role in funding agricultural research and rural infrastructure, including 
rural schools and public health clinics.  A competitive exchange rate will tend to keep 
rural tradables profitable, but investments to keep marketing competitive, especially 
through provision of timely market information, and to lower transactions costs in local 
and regional markets, will enhance this profitability.  In most rural environments, 
irrigation facilities and electrification will have a strong public component.  But macro 
economists note that these investment funds come at high opportunity costs to other 
sectors, or because of the distortions caused by public taxation, so providing clear 
benefit-cost justifications for their utilization will be important, and hence the concern for 
accurately valuing agricultural output. 
 
Research and technology 
 
No country has successfully transformed its agricultural sector and established strong 
rural-urban links to economic growth without sharply improving the level of technology 
used on its farms.  From the “agricultural revolution” in 18
th century England that fueled 
the first Industrial Revolution, to the “green revolution” that stimulated Asia’s “economic 
miracle,” new crop and livestock technologies have raised yields and generated rapid 
growth in total factor productivity in rural areas (Timmer, 1969, 2005; Mundlak, 2000).  
Modern science has increasingly been the source of these crop and livestock 
                                                           
3 The country case studies for “operationalizing pro-poor growth” show how difficult it has been to have a 
growth-oriented macro policy, especially in the context of Dutch Disease (Cord, 2004). 
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apply it to agricultural problems outpace their availability in many poor countries, the 
importance of supporting basic research at international centers--as a global public 
good—becomes stronger (Pardey and Beintema, 2001).   
 
But equally important is the adaptive research in national research centers that translates 
the basic agricultural science from the international centers into locally adapted plants 
and animals (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985).  Funding for these national centers has been 
under pressure for the past two decades, as budgets have more or less followed world 
commodity prices on their downward track (see Box 1). And completely unanswered at 
this point is the role bio-technology and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) might 
play in raising agricultural productivity in poor countries (Naylor and Manning, 2005; 
FAO, 2004; Timmer, 2003; World Bank, 2004d).  Part of this role is likely to be in the 
development of more productive germplasm for the so-called “orphan crops” that provide 
the bulk of staple foods for many poor households, especially in Africa and highland 







Box 1: Top scientific journals call for more public funding of rice research 
 
The leading scientific journals Nature and Science have both published calls urging renewed 
financial support for the Philippines-based International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). 
“Despite rumors to the contrary, the role of the International Rice Research Institute is as 
important as ever,” begins the editorial in the 1 May issue of Nature (Vol. 423) entitled Rice institute 
needs strong support.  However, it adds, “In the three years from 2001 to 2003, IRRI’s core funding 
dropped by 26%, and similar cuts are expected in the future.”  … 
In the same week, the 2 May issue of Science (Vol. 300) ran a broader look at the Green 
Revolution and the role played by IRRI and the other 15 international agricultural research centers 
(IARCS) in the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research.  In summarizing the 
findings of their book Assessing the impact of the Green Revolution, 1960 to 2000, R. E. Evenson and 
D. Gollin wrote that “the IARCS will have an important role to play in generating and sustaining future 
advances in agricultural technology for the developing world.” 
 The  Science authors add, “The budgets of many IARCS, not to mention many of their national 
program counterparts, have declined sharply in real terms over the past decade.”  This has come about, 
the authors surmise, in part because development agencies, “perhaps eager to find shortcuts to 
development, have tended to shift funding away from agricultural research and toward other priorities.” 
 
Press Release from IRRI, May 2003 
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Once all these elements are in place as the basis for profitable farming, policy attention 
and budget priorities should turn to the rural non-tradables sector.  Part of the profitability 
for this sector will come from a labor-intensive export sector that is successfully linked 
into the global economy, and in many countries this will include the agri-business sector.  
Rapid growth in this export sector creates demand for labor directly as well as for the 
goods and services of the rural economy that raise demand for labor indirectly. 
 
The rural non-farm sector is usually the bridge between commodity-based agriculture—
which is often on a “treadmill” between rising productivity and falling prices (Gardner, 
2002)—and livelihoods earned in the modern industrial and service sectors in urban 
centers.  Throughout Asia most rural households earn half or more of their incomes from 
non-farm sources, and often this sector is the “ladder” from underemployment at farm 
tasks to regular wage employment in the local economy, and from there to jobs in the 
formal sector (Mellor, 2000; Delgado, Hopkins and Kelly, 1998). 
 
What role for rural finance? 
 
A certain enthusiasm has grown over the past decade for market-based rural finance 
initiatives that circumvent the problems faced by earlier efforts to provide subsidized 
credit to small farmers so they could adopt modern technologies (Morduch, 1999).  By 
tapping the knowledge of local villagers of each other’s capacities for repayment of 
loans, grassroots micro finance operations have been widely established to provide 
vehicles for risk management and household savings.  Unfortunately, there is no 
significant evidence that these operations actually contribute to economic growth.  
Somewhat more surprising, the evidence is thin that such schemes actually reduce 
poverty in a sustainable fashion (Zeller and Meyer, 2002). 
 
What does seem to work, but which is much more difficult to implement, is a formal 
system of rural-urban financial intermediation that improves factor mobility.  Linking 
small, rural, local savings to investment opportunities outside the rural economy is 
arguably an important way to help households maximize returns on their capital, create 
incentives to save, and smooth the flow of resources out of agriculture as part of the 
structural transformation.  Establishing these linkages, however, requires reasonably large 
financial institutions, able to establish branch offices in rural areas and tap modern 
financial instruments in urban areas.  Such institutions tend not to spring up from rural 
roots. 
 
  22Why is this so Hard (Now)? 
 
 
Creating a dynamic and efficient agriculture was never easy, but policymakers in the 
1960s and 1970s had significant advantages over those in the 1980s and 1990s in creating 
the right environment for both public and private investments in their rural economies.
4  
The differences fall into four basic categories: (1) “new” and more difficult initial 
conditions confronting policymakers; (2) rising opposition from rich countries, both in 
the form of protection of their own farmers and concerns over losing their export 
markets; (3) a relatively stagnant shelf of available agricultural technologies that could be 
easily borrowed and widely adopted by farmers; and (4) donors who have been distracted 
from their core mission by development faddism and pressures from “single-issue” 
interest groups. 
 
DfID (2004) characterizes the same issues into two camps, the “smallholder optimists” 
and the “smallholder pessimists.”  The debate between the two camps is sharp: 
 
There is probably less of a consensus now—particularly amongst development 
agencies—on the best (in terms of impact on poverty and hunger) agricultural 
development strategy than at any time over the last half-century or longer (Ashley 
and Maxwell, 2001).  This is particularly true of Africa, where an unsuccessful 
model based on improving performance through technology supported by 
publicly owned development agencies has been replaced by the equally 
disappointing response of farmers to the liberalization of markets (Dfid, 2004, p. 
19). 
 
The smallholder pessimists, such as Maxwell (2004), argue that small-scale agriculture is 
becoming increasingly uncompetitive in the face of the revolution in supply chains and 
globalization of food trade.  The smallholder optimists, on the other hand, led by Lipton 
(2004) and scholars at IFPRI, hold that the historic relationships between agriculture and 
economic growth still hold, especially in Africa where smallholders are “protected” by 
high transportation costs and the cultivation of many non-tradable food commodities.  
Naturally, the policy conclusions of the two camps are totally different, and depend 
fundamentally on whether it is possible to skip the stage of agricultural modernization in 
the structural transformation. 
 
                                                           
4 A similar interpretation of the problems facing policymakers in developing countries in the 1960s and 
1970s, versus the problems facing policymakers now, is in Dorward, Kydd, Morison and Urey (2004).  
They stress the sharply different attitudes among the donors now toward governmental interventions in 
support of agricultural development, and are perhaps less concerned about the widespread governmental 
failures in those efforts.  This paper is more concerned about the origins of these donor attitudes in the 
policies of the rich countries and their concern to protect their own farmers.  In the end, we have very 
similar policy conclusions. 
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The initial success of the green revolution, and from it of agriculture as the engine of pro-
poor economic growth, was in East and Southeast Asia.  Despite difficult initial 
conditions in the minds of many—heavy population pressures against available arable 
land, poorly educated and overwhelmingly rural populations, with widespread and deep 
poverty—these turned out to be precisely the initial conditions that made investments in 
new agricultural technology and rural infrastructure highly profitable.  The remaining 
poor countries in Africa and Central Asia face low population densities in their low 
productivity areas, and hence building rural infrastructure to raise productivity in these 
areas is prohibitively expensive. 
 
Second, the real prices of agricultural commodities are now very low in historical terms, 
thus making it difficult to justify investments whose payoff will be increased production 
of exactly these low-valued commodities.  The real price of rice in world markets has 
dropped from $1000 per metric ton to $200 per metric ton in the past quarter century, and 
many other agricultural commodity prices have followed a similar trend (Dawe, 2001, 
2002; World Bank, 2004d).  With average farm size decreasing in most countries due to 
population growth, finding a technology package and farm-gate price that will increase 
farm household incomes above the poverty line is more than five times harder now than 
in the mid-1970s.  
 
Third, the easy investments in hospitable environments, especially for irrigation 
infrastructure, have mostly been made.  In the same fashion, high-yielding seed 
technology for widely uniform planting environments has been developed.  What remains 
are the more distant, more difficult, and less productive agricultural settings that have 
been bypassed by the main stream of the green revolution.  To add to the difficulties, the 
world now has more concern for environmental degradation, whether from expanding 
cultivated area into tropical rain forests, upstream and downstream impacts from 
construction of large dams, or simply the impact on fragile ecosystems of highly 
intensive cropping systems.  These environmental concerns have substantially raised the 
barrier to any large scale investment in raising agricultural output, at least with donor 
financing. 
 
In combination, the initial conditions facing the currently poorest countries (and regions), 
precisely those by-passed by the first green revolution, are far more difficult than those 
facing the successful countries in East and Southeast Asia.  The obvious question, but one 
without an obvious answer, is whether agricultural development is now simply too 
expensive, or too controversial, to pursue as the engine of pro-poor growth, even for 
those countries where the vast majority of the poor are farmers. 
 
  24Opposition from rich countries 
 
Increasingly, the rich countries are part of the problem rather than part of the solution.   
Agricultural protection in the OECD countries remains very high, despite agreements at 
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations that brought agriculture within the purview of 
the WTO.  This protection has two pernicious effects.  First, by maintaining production 
levels well above those that would be profitable without the subsidies and protection, 
global supplies are increased and world prices are lowered.  The actual consequences for 
developing countries are mixed and controversial, as a number of countries protect 
themselves against these “unfair” prices.  It is entirely possible that farmers and 
consumers in Indonesia, for example, might face lower rice prices after market 
liberalization because of the high protection provided now. 
 
Second, and perhaps more important, the rich countries have reserved an increasing share 
of world agricultural consumption for their own protected farmers.  The share of rich 
countries in agricultural exports has actually increased significantly in the past thirty 
years, contradicting everything economists think they know about comparative advantage 
and the structural transformation.  This would simply not have been possible without the 
massive subsidies the rich countries devote to their farmers.  The impact, of course, is to 
take market share away from the world’s poorest farmers. 
 
There is also a disconcerting concern in the legislatures of some rich countries, and 
especially in the United States, that successful agricultural development in poor countries 
will impair the export markets for agricultural products from rich countries.  This concern 
is manifest in legislative directives that prohibit USAID, for example, from helping poor 
countries develop their soybean, sugar, or orange industries.  It is manifest in the 
continued insistence that food aid is “development assistance,” despite overwhelming 
evidence that food aid usually distorts market incentives for local farmers (Oxfam, 2002).  
Cash transfers of even half the nominal value of the food aid would almost certainly do 
more good. 
 
Efforts have been made over the years to build the case that agricultural development is 
the necessary first step from which overall economic development is built, and that richer 
countries quickly graduate from being aid recipients to growing commercial markets for 
agricultural exports.  That case has strong historical precedents, and there can be little 
doubt that national welfare in both poor and rich country trading partners rises with 
economic growth in the poor country.  But individual commodity producers in rich 
countries can lose in this process, and they can be powerful advocates for restrictions on 
how development assistance is delivered to poor countries, if the result would be to 
jeopardize their market access.  By thwarting public-sector support for agricultural 
development by the rich donors, these commodity interests are also thwarting more rapid 
economic growth and poverty reduction. 
 
  25Stagnant technology and much more complicated problems 
 
Modern science and technology have wrought revolution after revolution in agriculture, 
resulting in crop yields and labor productivity so high in advanced countries that farmers 
are routinely paid to curb their abundance (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985; Johnson, 1997).  
The green revolution technologies that emerged from the CGIAR system in the 1960s 
provided a stimulus not just to the agricultural economies of the Asian countries able to 
utilize the fertilizer-responsive varieties of wheat and rice, but to pro-poor economic 
growth throughout the region. 
 
But two problems loom increasingly large.  First, cereal technologies for the most 
advanced agro-economic zones have been stagnant for a decade, and unless modern 
genetic technologies are brought to bear on the problem, there is little promise of a 
radical breakthrough in the visible future (Pingali, et al., 1997).  This has caused DfID to 
raise the following questions: 
 
Few doubt that achieving the MDG of halving the number of people living in 
absolute poverty by 2015 will require a significant improvement in agricultural 
performance, particularly in Africa.  But in looking at the future and the 
likelihood of this being achieved, differences of opinion emerge around two key 
questions:
5 
1.  Do the conditions exist for agricultural productivity to be increased where it is 
most needed and what part, if any, can small-scale agriculture play in 
achieving this? 
2.  Given quite fundamental differences in context between Asia in the Green 
Revolution and today’s poorest countries, will the historical relationship 
between agricultural growth and poverty reduction continue to hold true? 
 
Second, Africa’s cropping systems and (lack of) water control make agricultural research 
complicated and expensive.  There are few uniform tracts of mono-cropped cereals, with 
good water control and easy access to commercial inputs such as fertilizer, precisely the 
circumstances that made the green revolution feasible in Asia.  The harsh environment, 
both agronomically and commercially, is one reason for the complex cropping systems 
and risk-averse behavior. But such cropping systems are notoriously hard to improve, 
because standard research methodologies seek to control all variables but the one under 
investigation.  There are just too many variables for this approach to work very 
effectively in most African agricultural settings. 
 
There have been successes (Wiggins, 2000).  Hybrid maize and sorghum work well in 
Africa when appropriate inputs are available, and markets are available for the surpluses 
produced.  High-value crops such as green beans and flowers are exported successfully to 
                                                           
5  In comments on an earlier draft of this paper, Derek Byerlee took strong exception to the argument that 
technology for basic food grains has been stagnant for a decade, or that future productivity gains are highly 
questionable.  But grain yields in Asia and Africa have been flat since the early 1990s (DfID, 2004, p. 8) 
and the highest yielding experimental varieties at IRRI are no more productive than a decade ago.  Still, 
there are many opportunities for farmers to increase cereal yields through better management practices, 
even if the genetic potential of their seeds is not rising steadily. 
  26Europe.  A number of tree crops thrive when infrastructure is available and border prices 
reach farmers.  But the overall trend in food production per capita has been negative for 
two decades and there is little prospect of reversing that trend without massive 
investment in rural infrastructure and specialized agricultural research, neither of which 
seem to be on government or donor agendas.  Adrian Wood, the Chief Economist for 
DfID, has painted a picture of an African continent “hollowed out,” with most 
populations in the interior moving to the coasts, where they can be fed easily with 
imported food, and where access to ports and economies of scale in manufacturing might 
make the sector more competitive (Wood, 2002).  That is not exactly a picture of pro-
poor growth led by agriculture. 
 
Distracted donors and development faddism 
 
Development assistance is under challenge in most western societies.  One set of critics 
argues that the funding levels are inadequate—Western European leaders are pushing for 
a doubling of official development assistance (ODA).  In the United States, there is 
widespread doubt that development assistance works at all (Easterly, 2004).  Analysts in 
the World Bank have been working hard to sort out what works and what does not.  Their 
answer, perhaps not surprisingly, is that despite mistakes in the past, the donors in 
general and the World Bank in particular now know how to help poor countries get on a 
sustainable development path.  More money, they argue, can be used very productively 
(Collier, 2002; Sachs, 2005).
6 
 
The goals and mechanisms of development assistance have broadened considerably since 
the field was founded in the 1950s.  From an early emphasis on growth in gross domestic 
product (GDP) and containing communism, the mandate of most development agencies, 
and especially that of USAID, grew to include, among many other things, reductions in 
poverty, improvements in child health, gender equity, environmental sustainability, 
transition to market economies and democratization.
7 
 
                                                           
6 The debate over the impact of foreign assistance has been played out recently in a series of econometric 
exercises that purport to show the impact, or lack thereof, of foreign assistance on economic growth in 
recipient countries.  The current standard in this debate is Clemens, Radelet and Bhivnani (2004), who 
show that aid with expected impact in the “short-term,” i.e. within the four-year horizon of their panel data, 
does indeed have a large, robust, and highly significant impact on economic growth.  This short-term aid 
makes up about 45 percent of total aid, with another 45 percent devoted to “long-term” assistance, and 10 
percent devoted to emergency and humanitarian assistance.  Neither of the latter two components have a 
statistically significant impact on growth.  Clemens, Radelet and Bhivnani also provide an extensive review 
of the theoretical and empirical literature leading up to their work. 
 
7 Many institutions involved in development activities saw similar broadening of agendas.  The 
Development Advisory Service (DAS), founded by Harvard University in the early 1960s to help poor 
countries prepare economic development plans, expanded its scope in 1975 to become the Harvard Institute 
for International Development (HIID).  New activities in health, education, and rural development were 
integrated into the Institute’s traditional core of macroeconomists.  The University’s program on Women in 
Development was housed in HIID.  An environmental program started in the late 1970s with the arrival of 
Theo Panayotou.  Both in academia and government, development came to be seen as a multifaceted and 
complex process.  This progress came at a cost, however.  Focus was lost as agendas multiplied.  Harvard 
closed HIID in 1999, arguing that it was managerially too complex for an academic institution.   
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withdrawing the Agency from its economic growth agenda and emphasizing several 
themes of great interest to Congress:  short-run humanitarian assistance, especially food 
aid; health care, especially child survival and family planning programs; environmental 
sustainability, especially the development of agricultural technology for poor farmers, 
including women, working in fragile ecosystems; and gender issues more broadly.  As 
the challenges and opportunities presented by the collapse of communism in the former 
Soviet Union became apparent, democratization was added as a USAID objective. 
 
Somehow lost in the multiple agendas and donor efforts to program effectively in the face 
of developmental complexity was the need for poor countries to have growing economies 
as the only sustainable solution to all of their broader problems.  To turn on its head the 
title of Paul Streeten’s famous book on meeting basic needs, “first things first” means 
reestablishing economic growth as the foundation of development (Streeten, 1986).  The 
review by the Economist (2004) of Sebastian Mallaby’s recent book (2004) on James 
Wolfenson and the World Bank notes this lack of focus at the Bank and attributes it to 
too many “one issue” voices that Wolfenson, and the Bank, and the rest of the donor 
community, were listening to in an effort to be open and transparent to their critics.  The 
Economist’s criticism of Wolfenson is telling: 
 
Trying to placate the Bank’s critics seemed a good idea at the time, and he has 
managed to build constructive relationships with the more grown-up NGOs, such 
as OXFAM.  Yet most pressure groups “do not have an off switch,” as Mr. 
Mallaby puts it.  Nothing the Bank does will ever satisfy them, but by attaching 
some of the conditions that they demand to its loans, the World Bank makes those 
loans unattractive, despite their cheapness, to the more credit-worthy countries, 
such as Brazil, South Africa and China. ... Every infrastructure project the Bank 
funds must meet rich-world standards: nothing pretty may be bulldozed unless 
strictly necessary, and no worker may be asked to do anything that a Californian 
might find demeaning.  As a result, fewer dams, roads and flood barriers are built 
in poor countries.  More poor people stay poor, live in darkness and die younger 
(Economist, 2004, p. 99). 
 
Partly because so many new topics are on the development agenda, and partly because 
there is no accepted core of development theory and only hotly contested empirical 
“truths,” faddism has long dominated donor thinking about appropriate development 
strategy.  From community development in the 1950s, to import substitution in the 1960s, 
to reaching the poorest of the poor in the 1970s, to structural adjustment in the 1980s, to 
sustainable development in the 1990s, and back to community development now (in the 
name of “community-driven development), the search for something “new” as the answer 
to poverty has actually impeded the implementation of core strategies that focus on sound 
governance, effective macro economic management, and a reliance on sustained public 
support for private markets. 
 
From the point of view of enhancing pro-poor growth in developing countries—that is, 
linking the poor to rapid economic growth--leaders of donor agencies and managers of 
  28the global economy missed three opportunities over the past several decades.  First, two 
decades intervened between the first and the second world food conferences with little to 
show in terms of increased food security and reduced poverty in the most vulnerable 
countries, those that might have hoped that Henry Kissinger’s promise in 1976 that no 
child would go to bed hungry within a decade actually would translate into visible action 
(Timmer, 2005a). 
 
Second, subsidies to farmers in rich countries remain extremely large, despite promises 
made at the Uruguay Round to reduce them significantly.  The result has not just been a 
large budget burden in OECD countries.  More importantly for developing countries, the 
result has been increasing surpluses dumped on world markets, depressing world prices 
and the incomes of farmers in poor countries who have to compete with these prices.  The 
best guess is that every dollar of agricultural subsidies in rich countries costs farmers in 
poor countries a similar amount.  Official development assistance is only one quarter of 
this total, and very little of it goes to rural economies.  It is not a fair trade. 
 
Third, the Cold War took a terrible toll on good governance.  If we now recognize how 
important good economic governance is to the foundations of economic development, we 
are just coming to realize how the willingness of governments in the West to do business 
with any government ostensibly in the anti-communist camp undermined those 
institutional foundations.  Many decades have been lost in the creation of sound 
economic governance and they cannot be recaptured overnight.  Impatience on the part of 
donors will not help, and it may well impede progress. 
 
 
What Should Donors Do? 
 
 
It would be folly, or at least presumptuous, to offer detailed recommendations on what 
donors, and especially the World Bank, should do to revitalize the agricultural and rural 
economies of the poorest countries, and to hook these economies to a broader base of 
pro-poor growth.  The “optimism” and “pessimism” camps identified in the DfID (2004) 
report have starkly different policy implications, for example.  But there are six tasks that 
are pretty obvious, and need to be done whichever perspective is right, and it is 
appropriate to list them here.  Developing them into country programs will be, well, 
country specific.  But these tasks need to be done across the board. 
 
The obvious steps 
 
First, focus on the priority:  economic growth that reaches the poor. 
 
Second, invest in rural health and education, to enhance both productivity and mobility. 
 
Third, make rural-to-urban migration easier when rural development is too expensive. 
 
  29Fourth, push hard on global trade reforms to make agriculture more profitable for 
developing countries.  This will benefit both developed and developing countries. 
 
Fifth, make major investments in agricultural science and technology at both the global 
and national levels.  The historic rates of return on these investments have typically been 
three to four times the opportunity cost of capital.  The failure to invest more is one of the 
great public failures of our time.  Raising productivity of “orphan crops” may have 
especially high payoff for the poor. 
 
Finally, develop local financing and planning mechanisms for investments in rural 
infrastructure.  With political decentralization a reality in most developing countries, this 
is where the action will be in terms of investments that reach farm households. 
 
The “optimists” versus the “pessimists” 
 
Beyond these general recommendations, it seems likely that some countries probably 
offer hope along the “optimists” line of reasoning, and some fall into the “pessimists” 
camp.  Again, which is which will be country-, or at least region-specific.  But it is useful 
to summarize the conclusions that the DfID (2004) report offers in terms of policy 
approaches for each setting. 
 
Role  for  \     Optimists     Pessimists 
 
Rural human capital  Yes, for productivity    Yes, for flexibility 
  impact     of  exit 
 
Rural infrastructure  Yes, for input and output  Mostly wasted 
 markets 
 
Agricultural research  Yes, to raise yields and  Private sector activity 
  and lower food costs    for specialized supply  
      c h a i n s  
 
Targeted safety nets  A productive rural    Active government  
economy provides this  role to cushion trans- 
    ition  to  urban  areas 
 
Input subsidies      Needed to induce    Wasted 
     adoption  of  new   
     technologies 
 
Price guarantees/stability    Needed to maintain pro-  Difficult to imple- 
     ducer  incentives  and   ment  within  WTO   
     food  security    rules 
 
 
  30These are very different views of the world.  It seems unlikely that either the optimists or 
the pessimists are always right in all circumstances.  But admitting that the pessimists are 
likely to be right some of the time in some countries places the onus on supporters of 
agricultural-led, pro-poor growth to show that it is feasible and efficient.  History has 
been a powerful backer of this argument, but times have changed and the argument 
continues to need careful analytical and empirical support. 
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